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DEVELOPMENTS IN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-
1950-1960
JOHN C. MELANIPHYA TIE OUTSET the author would beg the reader's indulgence to
alter or limit the subject of his remarks from the topic of "Pub-
lic Corporations," which he was originally assigned, to that of
"Municipal Corporations." While municipal corporations, cities, in-
corporated towns, villages, and boroughs are public corporations, not
all public corporations are municipal corporations.1 This limitation,
while excluding a variety of bodies politic created or authorized by
the legislature, such as airport and housing authorities, drainage, fire
and flood control districts, and commissions ad infinitum, is more
illusory than real because it leaves for treatment what is probably the
most expansive general legal topic in the sphere of jurisprudence to-
day. The enormity of the field of municipal activity today gives a
vastness and complexity to the field of municipal law which was
unknown a few years ago. The increase in municipal duties, services,
responsibilities, and activities is due in a large part to the vast economic,
social, and scientific changes of the current era and to the tremendous
growth in area, population, and importance of urban areas. 2
Of paramount importance to the City of Chicago was the recent
decision in People ex rel. Adamowski v. Wilson.3 On March 2, 1960,
the City Council of the City of Chicago passed an ordinance creating
a Police Board of five members appointed by the Mayor, in and with
the consent of the City Council, to manage, control, and operate the
Police Department. On March 4, 1960, the Police Board recom-
mended to the Mayor that he appoint Orlando W. Wilson, Dean
of Criminology at the University of California, Superintendent of
Police to act under the direction and control of the Police Board.
1 Memphis Trust Co. v. Board of Directors, 69 Ark. 284, 62 S.A. 902 (1901).
2 RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW p. V. (1957).
3 20 I11.2d 568, 170 N.E.2d 605 (1960).
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Dean Wilson was given a contract for the period of three years
under the Purchasing Act 4 to make a survey of the Police Department
and make recommendations to the Board as to improvements. The
State's Attorney filed four actions in quo 'warranto which attacked
the reorganization of the Police Department. They questioned the
power of the City to establish a Police Board and also challenged the
authority of the City Council to abolish the office of Commissioner
of Police prior to December 31, 1960. They also attacked the quali-
fications of two members of the Board who were non-residents of
Chicago, and the qualifications of Mr. Wilson because he had not
resided in Illinois for one year prior to his appointment. The position
of the City was upheld in the Circuit Court of Cook County and
the action of that court was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois.
The City contended that, under section 23-78 of the Cities and
Villages Act5 providing the power "to prescribe the duties and powers
of all police officers," the City had been given plenary powers, which
included the authority to create a Police Board. As support therefore
the City relied heavily upon the 1878 Supreme Court decision in
Sheridan v. Colsin.6 The court sustained this approach by saying:
The choice between administration by an individual and administration by a
board is made by weighing considerations of relative expediency. The broad
powers granted by the General Assembly to the city council to allocate re-
sponsibility for the operation of the city government to such city officers,
with such powers and duties, as it determines to be necessary or expedient,
authorize it to determine whether to commit a particular segment of the city's
government to an individual officer, or to a board of officers. The city there-
fore, did not lack the power to establish a police board.7
The City further contended that chapter 24, section 9-87 of the 1959
ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES 8 was a special or local law and invalid,
in that it discriminated against the City of Chicago contrary to sec-
tion 22 of article IV of the Constitution of Illinois. Section 9-87 pro-
vides inter alia:
No person shall be eligible to any municipal office unless he is a qualified
elector of the municipality and has resided therein at least one year preceding
his election or appointment. However, in municipalities with less than 200,000
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, art. 22A (1959).
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 23-78 (1959).
6 78 Ill. 237 (1875).
7 People ex rel. Adamowski v. Wilson, 20 Ill.2d 568, 575-76, 170 N.E.2d 605, 610
(1960).
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 9-87 (1959).
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population according to the last preceding Federal or State census, these re-
quirements shall not apply to the municipal engineer, health officers or other
officers who require technical training or knowledge .... 9
Plaintiff admitted that the two non-resident members of the Board
possessed "technical training or knowledge" within the meaning of
section 9-87, but urged that this was immaterial since the population
of the City of Chicago is in excess of 200,000. The Supreme Court
recognized that legislative classification based upon population is valid
if there is a reasonable relationship between the objective sought to
be accomplished by the law and the population differences fixed by
the General Assembly. But in the absence of such a relationship, legis-
lative classification upon the basis of population is discriminatory and
invalid. It said that a plain objective of section 9-87 is to give munici-
palities the opportunity to utilize, in the management of municipal
affairs, the services of those persons who have special technical train-
ing and knowledge without regard to their place of residence. The
court held: "Because the population classification of section 9-87 op-
erates, without discernible justification to deprive the largest city,
whose problems are more likely to be complex, of expert assistance
which is available to all other cities, it violates the provisions of sec-
tion 22 of article IV of the constitution.' u0
When Mr. Wilson was appointed, he was a citizen and resident of
California. In disposing of plaintiff's contention that Mr. Wilson was
an officer and therefore subject to the requirement of the statute that
he be a resident at least one year before his appointment, the court
held: "In the performance of his duties, he is subordinate to the Police
Board, his actions are subject to its control and direction, and it may
remove him for cause. For these reasons we are of the opinion that
he is an employee, and not an officer."" The decision of the Supreme
Court in this case is of vital importance to the welfare of the City of
Chicago because it recognizes that there are situations requiring the
exercise of broad police powers in the solving of complex problems
faced by a large city.
MOVIE CENSORSHIP-THE "DON JUAN" DECISION
On January 23, 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States
rendered its opinion finding the Censorship Ordinance of the City of
9 Ibid.
10 People ex rel. Adamowski v. Wilson, 20 11l.2d 568, 581, 170 N.E.2d 605, 613 (1960).
11 Id. at 583, 170 N.E.2d at 614.
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Chicago constitutional. 2 Section 155-1 of the Municipal Code of the
City of Chicago requires submission of all motion pictures for exam-
ination prior to their public exhibition., The petitioner, a New York
corporation, applied for a permit as Chicago's ordinance required,
and tendered the license fee, but refused to submit the film known
as Don Juan for examination. The permit was refused and the peti-
tioner brought suit in the United States District Court, seeking in-
junctive relief ordering the issuance of the permit without submission
of the film, and also seeking to restrain the city officials from inter-
fering with the exhibition of the picture, on the sole ground that the
provision of the ordinance requiring submission of the film consti-
tuted, on its face, a prior restraint within the prohibition of the first
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that nei-
ther a substantial federal question nor even a justiciable controversy
was presented. 4 The Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, af-
firmed the District Court, finding that the case presented merely an
abstract question of law since neither the film nor evidence of its
contents was submitted. 5
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a five-to-four decision
upholding the validity of the ordinance, was careful to limit its find-
ings to the narrow issue presented. It was careful to stress the fact
that the petitioner refused to submit the motion picture for review
prior to exhibition because of petitioner's contention that even if the
picture was obscene, "it may nonetheless be shown without prior
submission for examination.' 16 It carefully limited the scope and effect
of the decision. It reiterated that the issue was "the censor's basic
authority" and did not involve "any statutory standards employed
by the censor or procedural requirements as to the submission of the
film.""
Mr. Justice Clark, who delivered the opinion of the Court, defined
the limitations to be placed upon the power of prior restraint under
12 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
13 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 155-1 (1939).
14 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 180 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
15 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 272 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 917 (1960).
16 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961).
17 Ibid.
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the provisions of the first and fourteenth amendments. He made it
clear that "prior restraint" was the exception and in the case of motion
pictures should be limited "against the dangers of obscenity in the
public exhibition of motion pictures."'1 8 Mr. Justice Clark concluded
that "certainly petitioner's broadside attack does not warrant, nor
could it justify on the record here, our saying that-aside from any
consideration of the other 'exceptional cases' mentioned in our deci-
sions-the State is stripped of all constitutional power to prevent, in
the most effective fashion, the utterance of this class of speech."1"
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the dissenters, conceded that
the "protection afforded the First Amendment liberties from previous
restraint is not absolutely unlimited. ' 20 However, he was of the opin-
ion that licensing or censorship was not considered within the "ex-
ceptional cases" discussed in Near v. Minnesota.2 1
The fact that Times Film refused to submit the motion picture prior
to exhibition becomes of primary importance in examining the diver-
gent views of Mr. Justice Clark, for the majority, and Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, for the dissenters. Mr. Justice Clark stated the issue
to be "whether the ambit of constitutional protection includes com-
plete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every
kind of motion picture."22 Mr. Chief Justice Warren took issue with
this statement and defined the issue to be "whether the City of Chi-
cago ... may require all motion picture exhibitors to submit all films
to a police chief, mayor or other administrative official, for licensing
and censorship prior to public exhibition within the jurisdiction. '23
Mr. Chief Justice Warren presumed the unexhibited motion picture not
to be obscene, whereas the petitioner claimed that the nature of the film
was irrelevant and stated that even if this "film contains the basest
type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful overthrow
of orderly government, it may nonetheless be shown without prior
submission for examination."24 Further evidence of divergent views
of the issues involved may be observed by comparing the statement
of Mr. Chief Justice Warren that the Court's decision "gives official
license to the censor, approving a grant of power to city officials to
prevent the showing of any motion picture these officials deem un-
8 Id. at 49. 20Id. at 53.
19 Id. at 49-50. 21283 U.S. 697 (1931).
22 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 46 (1961).
23 Id. at 55. 24 Id. at 47.
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worthy of a license, '125 with Mr. Justice Clark's denial that "we, of
course, are not holding that city officials may be granted the power
to prevent the showing of any motion picture they deem unworthy
of a license." '2 6
While Mr. Justice Clark, and the majority of the Court, were of
the opinion that prior restraint of obscene and pornographic motion
pictures is not prohibited by the the first and fourteenth amendments,
and while Mr. Chief Justice Warren, and the concurring dissenters,
were of the opinion that prior restraint may be used in "exceptional"
instances, but not by "licensing and censoring" motion pictures, Mr.
Justice Douglas declared that the first amendment does not permit
censorship or prior restraint of motion pictures.
Although the opinion of the Court in the Don Juan case is limited
to censorship of obscene motion pictures, it is, nevertheless, an ex-
tremely important decision in municipal law. This is the first decision
by the Supreme Court of the United States squarely passing upon
the issue of prior restraint and censorship as applied to motion pic-
tures. Laying aside all personal opinions and previous court decisions
limiting the right of censorship pertaining to other media of expression,
it is apparent that the motion picture has an impact on the
viewer, not present in any other form of expression. This is especially
true when the motion picture is obscene. The public welfare requires
that a municipality have the power to censor motion pictures. In view
of this necessity, the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States is morally and legally sound.
THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Probably the most talked about decision in the field of municipal
law during the past ten years is Molitor v. Kaneland Comunity Unit
Dist. No. 302,28 wherein the following broad principles were an-
nounced:
(I) The doctrine of governmental immunity generally, is a court-created
doctrine.
(2) The attempt of the courts to classify functions of municipal corporations
into "proprietary" or "governmental" and to fix liability accordingly, has
produced incongruities in the law.
(3) The doctrine of governmental immunity found its way into Illinois on
25 Id. at 55. 27 Id. at 78.
26 Id. at 50. 28 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
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the basic premise that "the King can do no wrong" which premise can no
longer be justified.
(4) Generally, liability follows negligence and the doctrine of governmental
immunity runs directly counter to this basic concept.29
The Molitor case involved a school district, but subsequent attempts
to so limit its sweeping declarations were quickly set aside in List v.
O'Connor30 where the contention was made that the decision did not
settle the question as to park districts. In meeting this contention the
Supreme Court observed: "It seems clear under the Molitor case that
•.. the decision of that case relating to a school district would, ob-
viously, have equal application to park districts."8' 1 And again in
Lynwood v. Decatur Park Dist.,3 2 the court said: "While the holding
of the Molitor case was confined to school district, it is clear that the
foregoing principles would apply to other municipal corporations as
well." 33
The seventy-first Illinois General Assembly took steps immediate-
ly to neutralize the impact of the Molitor case by legislatively re-
establishing immunity from tort liability for counties," park districts,"
forest preserve districts, 6 and for all claims in excess of $10,000 against
public school districts and not-for-profit private schools. 7
Attention is called to the fact that in the Molitor case and in each
of its subsequent companion cases an affirmative act of negligence
was the basis upon which the court found the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity unpalatable. It is submitted that when confronted
with a case of pure governmental immunity, untarnished by the inter-
vening affirmative act of negligence, the Molitor decision will not be
extended, and that the doctrine of governmental immunity will stand.
29 As stated by the court in Lynwood v. Decatur Park Dist., 26 I11. App.2d 431, 434-
35, 168 N.E.2d 185, 186 (1960).
30 19 ll.2d 337, 167 N.E.2d 188 (1960).
31 Id. at 340, 167 N.E.2d at 190.
32 26 111. App.2d 431, 168 N.E.2d 185 (1960).
33 Id. at 435, 168 N.E.2d at 186. At this point the court cited as follows cases in which
it had been determined that the principles of Molitor applied: "Peters v. Bellinger,
19 Ill.2d 367, 166 N.E.2d 581 (cities); List v. OConnor, 19 Ill.2d 337, 167 N.E.2d 188
(park districts); and ... Miller v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. App.2d 56, 165 N.E.2d 724
(park districts)." Ibid.
34 hI. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (1959).
35 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, §§ 12.1-1, 333.2a (1959).
36 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 ,§ 3a (1959).
37 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 821-31 (1959).
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Support for this premise will be found in the recent Illinois Appellate
Court cases of Adamczyk v. Zambel 38 and Olipra v. Zarnbelli.39
The plaintiff in each of these cases sustained personal injuries as a
result of a fireworks explosion during a local street parade in Chicago.
The parade had been licensed by the City, as had an intended fire-
works display at a designated location. Two City policemen were
assigned to guard the money collected as the parade progressed along
its route, and to direct traffic when the parade came to an intersection.
Unknown persons on the truck carrying the fireworks to the site of
the display exploded a bomb causing the projection of shrapnel, which
injured plaintiffs in these suits. The City of Chicago was made party
defendant in both suits for the failure of its police to enforce the
ordinance prohibiting shooting of fireworks in the street. The Appel-
late Court specifically noted the finding in the Molitor case, as well
as the apparent extension thereof in Peters v. Bellinger40 and Pree v.
Hymbaugh,41 and stated: "This and other cases cited involve affirm-
ative negligent or wilful acts by municipal employees .... Municipal
Corporations, not being insurers against accident, are not liable for
every accident occurring within their limits. '42 The court concluded
as follows:
[W]e hold that the exercise of a city's police power is a governmental func-
tion for the benefit of the public and general welfare. A municipality is not
liable in tort for the failure of its policemen to prevent and stop others from
violating the law.... [Citations omitted.] The wrong was not in the City but
in those who improperly and unlawfully used the street.43
Another example of the courts refusal to make the municipality an
insurer for all injuries sustained on its streets and alleys may be found
in Weiss v. City of Chicago.44 Here, a five-year old boy suffered severe
burns from an unattended rubbish fire in a public alley. In sustaining
the directed verdict which had been awarded the city at the close
of plaintiff's case the Appellate Court said: "To hold the City re-
sponsible for plaintiff's injuries . . . , would be to impose an oppressive
38 25 111. App.2d 121, 166 N.E.2d 93 (1960), petition for leave to appeal denied by Illi-
nois Supreme Court.
39 28 111. App.2d 460, 171 N.E.2d 798 (1961).
40 22 111. App.2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528 (1959).
4123 111. App.2d 211, 162 N.E.2d 297 (1959).
42 Adamczyk v. Zambelli, 25 111. App.2d 121, 127, 166 N.E.2d 93,97 (1960).
43 Id. at 128, 166 N.E.2d at 97.
44 23 11. App.2d 280, 162 N.E.2d 601 (1959).
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and unreasonable burden and shift the care of a child from its parents
to strangers."45 The court also held, as a matter of law, that common
alley rubbish fires are not one of the dangerous street and alley condi-
tions which the City must guard against.
One final tort case which might be mentioned because of its im-
plication on municipalities is Swenson v. City of Rockford.46 In this
case, where plaintiff fell on a sidewalk, she testified that she knew
that it was defective, had used it four or five times a week for ten
years, and though she saw the ridge in the pavement before she fell,
she nevertheless proceeded to place her left foot upon said ridge. On
these facts, the Appellate Court found the plaintiff guilty of contrib-
utory negligence as a matter of law 47 and reversed the judgment of
the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court
by saying: "The use of a defective sidewalk by a person who has
knowledge of the defect is not contributory negligence per se .. ,,4S
and directed that the question be submitted to the jury as a question
of fact rather than one to be decided by the court as a question of
law. It is difficult to envision a fact situation more favorable to the
municipality. Thus, from the court's holding in this extreme factual
background, it appears that the defense of contributory negligence as
a matter of law is no longer available to cities, and that in each case
its determination is for the jury.
URBAN RENEWAL
The provision of low-rent public housing and the elimination and
prevention of slums and urban blight constitute comparatively recent
accretions to local governmental functions. In 1945, the case of Zurn
v. City of Cbicago,49 brought Illinois into the impressive list of states
wherein favorable court decisions have established the constitutionality
of laws authorizing slum clearance and urban redevelopment. This
landmark case provided the solid basis upon which Chicago's vigorous
Urban Renewal Program is founded and set the judicial tone for deci-
sions during the past decade.
An urban redevelopment or urban renewal project connotes a fu-
45 Id. at 284, 162 N.E.2d at 603.
46 9 1I1.2d 122, 136 N.E.2d 777 (1956).
47 7 Ill. App.2d 72, 129 N.E.2d 52 (1955).
48 Swcnson v. City of Rockford, 9 11.2d 122, 127, 136 N.E.2d 777, 779 (1956).
4) 389 IM. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945).
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ture use of the project area generally by private enterprise for resi-
dential, commercial, industrial, or other purposes, and in part by
public agencies, in accordance with comprehensive community plan-
ning requirements."0 A vital ingredient to the effective operation of
an urban renewal project is the authorization of the use of eminent
domain in the carrying out of its objectives. The principle supporting
that authorization is that ending a slum under supervision and control
of public authority is a "public use." In the Zurn case, the court
dismissed the contention that the Neighborhood Redevelopment Act
authorized the taking of private property for private rather than
public purposes by ruling: "The taking of property for the purpose
of the elimination, redevelopment and rebuilding of slum and blight
areas, meets all the requirements of a public use and public purpose
within the principles of the law of eminent domain."'" The court also
pointed out that the fact that land might subsequently be returned
to private use had no effect on the validity of the statute, since the
redevelopment itself was the public use and purpose.
This language, authorizing the combination of public power and
private initiative, and the joinder of private and public funds, is the
cornerstone of urban renewal and community conservation in Illinois.
Subsequent decisions extended the above rationale to allow the use
of eminent domain first, in the acquisition of vacant land for resi-
dential use,52 and then, for purposes other than residential,5 3 and for
the prevention,54 as well as the elimination, 5 of slums and blight. In
upholding the Urban Community Conservation Act and its proviso
for eminent domain in the prevention of slums, the court met the
argument that the line of demarcation between a public and private
use in the employment of eminent domain to eliminate slum areas
must be the elimination rather than the prevention of slums, by stating:
[W]e are aware of no constitutional principle which paralyzes the power
of government to deal with an evil until it has reached its maximum develop-
ment. Nor is there force in the argument that if the use of eminent domain in
the prevention of slums is permitted "every piece of property within the city
50RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 520 (1957).
51 Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389111. 114,128, 59 N.E. 18,25 (1945).
52 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 IM. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953).
53 People ex rel. Adamowski v. Land Clearance Comm'n, 14 Ill.2d 74, 150 N.E.2d 792
(1959).
54 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954).
55 Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. White, 411 Ill. 310, 104 N.E.2d 236 (1952).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
or State can be condemned to prevent it from becoming a slum." Legitimate
use of governmental power is not prohibited because of the possibility that
the power may be abused.56
Condemnation under urban renewal is but the final phase of a
municipality's never-ending effort to keep itself free from slums,
blight, and obsolescence and, in effect, starts the cycle anew. The first
step is at the construction level, where plans and specifications must
be in conformity with established building standards as set out in
building codes for the safety and protection of its citizenry. These
standards embrace the latest in building methods and materials and
assure the community that modem building will afford the maximum
in safety. A more perplexing problem, however, is the securing of
these modern safety measures for the occupants and users of the older
or pre-ordinance buildings. This is achieved by providing for retro-
activity in crucial safety ordinances, and the acceptance of this ap-
proach by the Illinois courts of appellate jurisdiction during the past
ten years has been of great significance.
The general rule appears to be that, while regulations restricting
the use of property do not ordinarily have retroactive effect, munici-
pal corporations in the exercise of their police power may, within
reasonable bounds, enact ordinances or regulations having such ef-
ect.57 The judicial sentiment in Illinois in this area appears in the
adopted language of City of Seattle v. Hinckley, s which has been
described by the Illinois Supreme Court as "a landmark case in the
field": 11
IT]here is no merit in the contention that the respondent had any inherent
or vested right because he had complied with the law existing at the time he
built. There is no such thing as an inherent or vested right to imperil the
health or impair the safety of the community. But to be protected against such
impairment or imperilment is the universally recognized right of the com-
munity in all civilized governments-a protection which the government not
only has a right to vouchsafe to the citizens, but which it is its duty to extend
in the exercise of its police power .... It would be a sad commentary on the
law if municipalities were powerless to compel the adoption of the best meth-
ods for protecting life in such cases, simply because the confessedly faulty
method in use was the method provided by law at the time of its construction.60
56 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 3 IU.2d 539, 545, 121 N.E.2d 791, 795
(1954).
57 Abbate Bros. v. City of Chicago, 11 l.2d 337, 142 N.E.2d 691 (1957).
58 40 Wash. 468, 82 Pac. 747 (1905).
59 Abbate Bros. v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill.2d 337, 347, 142 N.E.2d 691,694 (1957).
60 City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 471, 82 Pac. 747, 748-49 (1905).
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The retroactive application of municipal fire, safety, and health ordi-
nances to existing buildings received further approval when the Ap-
pellate Court stated: "Individuals working in pre-ordinance buildings
are entitled to the same degree of fire protection as those working in
post-ordinance buildings; and we think that it was the intent of the
city council to afford the largest possible measure of protection to
all."61
Protection of the safety of persons is one of the traditional uses of
the police powers, and the broadening effect which these cases have
given to the exercise of that power secure for the community uniform
protection afforded by advances in engineering and safety technique.
In 1959, court approval was secured for the retroactive application
of ordinances providing for handrails on exit stairways,62 and for
automatic sprinkler systems in men's cubicle hotels. 68 Thus, in the
short span of four years, impressive authority on the premise has
been established.
To more adequately cope with building deterioration and obso-
lescence, the 1953 Illinois General Assembly 4 added sections 23-70.2
and -70.3 to the Revised Cities and Villages Act,65 securing for the
City of Chicago the power to demolish dangerous and unsafe build-
ings, or, in the alternative, to procure from a court of competent
jurisdiction a mandatory injunction against the owner requiring com-
pliance with building, fire, health, and safety ordinances. Prior to
this enactment, these matters were handled under the abatement of
nuisance procedure, which was actually an illusory weapon against
this very real and pressing evil. In September 1960, the Appellate
Court, referring to the abovementioned section 23-70.2, said: "[T]he
purpose of the act is clear. It is to give the city a quick and effective
means of removing those unused and dilapidated structures that pre-
sent danger and blight. '166
Additional support for the municipality in its fight against slum
61 City of Chicago v. L. J. Sheridan Co., 18 II. App.2d 57, 67, 151 N.E.2d 451, 459
(1958).
62 McQueeny v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 21 Iil. App.2d 553, 159 N.E.2d 43 (1959).
68 City of Chicago v. National Management Inc., 22 M11. App.2d 445, 161 N.E.2d 358
(1959).
64 IMI. Laws 1953, at 1112.
65 ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 24, S§ 23-70.2 to -70.3 (1959).
66 City of Chicago v. Mulligan Enterprises, 27 Ill. App.2d 481, 487, 170 N.E.2d 13, 17
(1960).
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housing is found in City of Chicago v. Hademan,67 wherein the court
held that to require the City to give notice prior to bringing suit
would amount to an invitation to land owners to flout the law until
all the legal formalities could be met. The court felt that "such an
administration of the housing ordinances would be ... costly indeed,
in terms of human life and in terms of expensive procedure for ad-
ministration." 8 The court further stated:
* . . [The mass inspection method, which is the most thorough-going type
of inspection undertaken to date, reflects a growing social consciousness on
the part of city officials in behalf of lower bracket income occupants of multi-
ple-housing units; . . . it is clearly a proper and laudable exercise of public
powers.6 9
The power to license and control building contractors working
within the corporate limits of a municipality is of great importance
in maintaining integrity in building repairs and code consciousness
in general contractors. Although the statutes are barren of any spe-
cific grant of such authority to municipalities, the Supreme Court,
in Concrete Contractors' Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. Village of
LaGrange Park7 ° held that cities have the implied power to so license
and regulate. This case was subsequently deemed controlling in Vil-
lage of May'wood v. Weglarz71 where the Appellate Court sustained
the validity of an ordinance licensing carpenters. There is no reason
to believe that this regulatory power cannot be further extended
to apply to other critical building trades, and thereby afford the city
a further means of securing for its citizenry the benefit of its health
and safety ordinances by assuring code compliance in all construction
work performed.
ZONING
Generally speaking, it is this author's opinion that no other sub-
topic under municipal law has had more judicial attention during the
past ten years than zoning. The official court reports for the 1950's
are liberally sprinkled with cases challenging the validity or reason-
ableness of zoning provisions. Yet, despite this prominence, very little
in the way of substantive development or expansion of the estab-
lished principles has taken place. Zoning cases by and large are re-
6717 111. App.2d 150, 149 N.E.2d 425 (1958).
681d. at 158, 149 N.E.2d at 429. 70 14 Il.2d 65, 150 N.E.2d 783 (1958).
09 Id. at 157, 149 N.E.2d at 429. 71 24 11. App.2d 495, 165 N.E.2d 362 (1960).
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solved within the framework and makeup of the geographical locale
in which the subject lots or parcels are found, thus restricting their
applicability in future cases involving different parcels. The numerical
vastness of the litigation stems jointly from the population boom in
newly incorporated suburban areas and from the attempts of the
older-established communities to up-date or revise their existing zoning
provisions in line with the modern needs and wishes of the residents.
That questions of best usage and classification boundaries will always
be explosively debatable is the prime reason that a presumption of
validity exists7 2 and that courts refrain from substituting their judg-
ment for that of the legislative body.73
Reasonableness is the key to sustaining zoning provisos and,
.. among the particular facts and circumstances to be taken into considera-
tion in determining whether a zoning ordinance is so unreasonable and con-
fiscatory as to constitute an unlawful invasion of private rights are the char-
acter of the neighborhood, the zoning classification and use of nearby proper-
ties, the extent to which property values are diminished by the particular
zoning restrictions involved and the gain to the public compared to the hard-
ship imposed on the individual property owner.74
A significant line of cases has come before the court as a direct out-
growth of extensive re-zoning in recent years. The first of these was
Deer Park Civic Ass'n v. City of Chicago,75 wherein a building permit
was issued to erect a factory after the passage of an amendatory zon-
ing ordinance, but before its effective date. Under the provisions of
the amendatory ordinance, such permit could not have been issued.
The court found that the company had entered into contracts for
construction and had incurred substantial obligations, had done work
pursuant to the permit in reliance on zoning, and had thereby ac-
quired a vested right to continuance of the construction of the build-
ing, notwithstanding the subsequent re-zoning. Again, in 1958, the
Illinois Supreme Court had before it a matter concerning the retro-
active effect of zoning ordinances, and there stated that "the general
rule in Illinois" concerning such matters was as stated in the Deer
Park case, i.e.:
72 Rams-Head Co. v. City of Des Plaines, 9 I1.2d 326, 137 N.E.2d 259 (1956); Fox v.
City of Springfield, 10 I11.2d 198, 139 N.E.2d 732 (1957).
73 Wesemann v. Village of LaGrange Park, 407 111. 81,94 N.E.2d 904 (1951).
74 Rams-Head v. City of Des Plaines, 9 IIl.2d 326, 333,137 N.E.2d 259, 263 (1956).
75 347 Ill. App. 346, 106 N.E.2d 823 (1952), petition for leave to appeal denied, 412
11. 629 (1952).
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[A]ny substantial change of position, expenditures or incurrence of obliga-
tions occurring under a building permit or in reliance upon the probability of
its issuance is sufficient to create a right in the permittee and entitles him to
complete the construction and use the premises for the purpose originally au-
thorized irrespective of a subsequent zoning or change in zoning classifica-
tion.7 6
Rules such as the "vested right" rule do much to safeguard the
owner from any out-of-pocket loss as a result of re-zoning; however,
they also, to an immeasurable extent, undermine the beneficial effects
envisioned by the new legislation. Zoning ordinances are in the work-
ings for months, surveys are made, statistics are gathered, conferences
and even public hearings are had before they become a reality. During
this necessary interim, building permits are issued which, in effect,
perpetuate the evil sought to be remedied, because they allow the
construction of a structure which will be a non-conforming use be-
fore it is completed. It was to this very problem that the court's atten-
tion was directed in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine,77
and the sympathetic treatment which it was afforded provides the
basis for high expectations of expanding judicial consideration in the
future. Discussing the pendency of a comprehensive ordinance as
grounds for refusal of a building permit the court said:
There has been no decision in Illinois on this precise question. However it
has been considered in other jurisdictions and the rule there laid down is that
while the municipal authority has no right to arbitrarily or unreasonably re-
fuse or delay the issuance of the permit, the issuance may be delayed when
there is under consideration or pending an ordinance under which the is-
suance of the permit would be prohibited. It is our opinion that this rule is
supported by reason as well as by authority.78
It must be noted, however, that the court tempered this language
and considerably limited its scope by expressly affirming the afore-
mentioned "vested right" rule of the Deer Park case. Thus, the status
of the law seems to have been maintained upon a showing of "sub-
stantial work"79 and "good faith' 80 reliance on the permit or the prob-
76 Fifteen Fifty North State Street v. City of Chicago, 15 Ill.2d 408, 416, 155 N.E.2d
97, 101 (1958). See also People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of
Morton Grove, 16 Ill.2d 183,157 N.E.2d 33 (1959).
77 22 Ill. App.2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697 (1959).
78 Id. at 268, 160 N.E.2d at 699 (1959).
79 Deer Park Civic Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 347 111. App. 346, 353, 106 N.E.2d 823,
825 (1952), sets out what constitutes "substantial work" under the permit.
80 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine, 22 111. App.2d 264, 271, 160 N.E.2d
697,700 (1959).
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ability of its issuance, regardless of the pendency of the ordinance.
In an exhaustive opinion long overdue in Illinois, Bright v. City of
Evanston,8' the Supreme Court for the first time set out the judicial
routes to be followed by litigants contesting the validity of zoning
provisions. The court decided that one claiming that the ordinance is
void in its entirety may seek direct judicial review, without first em-
ploying any of the remedies which the ordinance itself provides.
Where, however, he claims that applications of a certain classification
to his property is not lawful, but does not attack the ordinance as a
whole, he may seek judicial relief only after he has exhausted all
administrative remedies.
The most recent development in the law of zoning is the acknowl-
edgement that in the trial court's order declaring existing zoning in-
valid, it is appropriate for the court to frame its judgment or decree
with reference to the record before it; and where a specific use was
contemplated the relief awarded may guarantee that the owner will be
allowed to proceed with that use without further litigation and that he
will not proceed with a different use. 2 Hitherto, such orders were
limited to a declaration of the invalidity of the zoning as to the particu-
lar property, the effect of which was to leave the property unzoned.
In discounting the argument that by this procedure the court goes be-
yond the realm of adjudication and itself becomes a zoning agency,
the court said: "The end result of the procedure which we adopt for
declaratory judgment and injunction cases does not differ from that in
litigation involving mandamus (where the order directs the issuance
of the permit) and administrative review (where the order directs that
a specific variation be allowed)." 83
Frontage consent ordinances have long been treated as akin to zon-
ing and have a history in Illinois municipalities which, in many in-
stances, even pre-dates the zoning ordinance. These ordinances, which
require the written consent of property owners within a prescribed
distance from the maintenance or construction of specified uses (viz.,
gasoline stations, hospitals, nursing home, etc.), have now, for many
years, been virtually impossible to sustain when put to a test against the
81 10 ll.2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1957).
82 Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill.2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406
(1960); Nelson v. City of Rockford, 19 7ll.2d 410, 167 N.E.2d 219 (1960).
83 Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 1ll.2d 370, 379, 167 N.E.2d
406,410 (1960).
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backdrop of a specific parcel or use. In Valkanet v. City of Chicago,8 4
the court examined at great length the state of the law concerning
frontage consents, noted the considerable difference of opinion as to the
validity of such, and pointed out that the rationale of their holdings
was:
[I]f an ordinance permits a certain percentage of the property owners to
impose or create a restriction upon their neighbors' property by the device
of consent provisions, such limitation constitutes an invalid delegation of legis-
lative power, but if the consent provision merely waives or modifies a lawful
and reasonable legislative restriction or prohibition, it is within constitutional
limitations.85
That this distinction was more imaginary than real, soon became ob-
vious to the court and in Drovers Trust & Say. Bank v. City of Chi-
cagos" it found frontage consent provisions to be invalid and unconsti-
tutional in the following words:
Since Valkanet we have given the matter further study and feel that the
subtle distinction between "creating" and "waiving" a restriction cannot be
justified. Each constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power where the
ordinances, as here, leave the ultimate determination of whether the erection
of the station would be detrimental to the public welfare in the discretion of
individuals rather than the city.
The plaintiff's right to conduct a legitimate business in a district zoned
commercial, in which the contemplated business is permitted, can not be left
to the whim and caprice of neighboring owners. The procuring or non-pro-
curing of frontage consents has no bearing upon the public health or welfare,
and such a requirement is an unwarranted and unauthorized exercise of the
police power.87
ANNEXATION OF UNINCORPORATED TERRITORY
The flourishing of new communities and the expansion of estab-
lished cities and villages during the '50's gave rise to keen competition
for annexation of available unincorporated territory. It was not un-
usual for several interests to be actively pursuing annexation or incor-
poration petitions for the same territory at the same time.88 This
clamor for expanded corporate limits or inclusion of a particularly de-
sirable parcel reached what the Supreme Court called "unnatural and
obviously unreasonable" consequences in People ex. rel. Adamowski
84 13 ll.2d 268, 148 N.E.2d 767 (1958).
85 1d. at 272, 148 N.E.2d at 769-770 (Emphasis added.)
86 18 11.2d 476, 165 N.E.2d 314 (1960).
87 Id. at 478, 165 N.E.2d at 315.
88 City of East St. Louis v. Touchette, 14 I11.2d 243, 150 N.E.2d 178 (1958).
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v. Village of Streamwood.s9 Here the defendant village by ordinance
"purported to annex some 75 miles of roadway in the general vicin-
ity of the village, but only a small fraction of the roadways allegedly
annexed ran through the village or were contiguous to the village in
the sense that the annexed roadway was contiguous to and parallel
with the then village limits." 9° Subsequently the defendant village
purported to annex a subdivision several miles away but connected
by one of the roadways. The court noted this "spider's web effect"
and stated:
Contiguous, for any reasonable interpretation of section 7-8 of the Revised
Cities and Villages Act, must mean contiguous in the sense of adjacent to and
parallel to the existing municipal limits and cannot, under any circumstances,
permit a municipality by annexation ordinances to grab a whole maze of road-
ways, circumscribing and choking off unincorporated areas and causing them
to be completely surrounded by a maze of roadways annexed to a munici-
pality.91
Subsequent to this decision, the question of whether territories are
"contiguous" for purposes of annexation or incorporation has received
considerable judicial comment, the most recent of which is found in
Western Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer,' wherein the
court held:
[I]n order to be considered contiguous within the meaning of the statute
[incorporation of a village], the tracts of land in the territory must touch or
adjoin one another in a reasonably substantial physical sense. However, the
line of demarcation between the reasonableness and unreasonableness of the
continuity cannot be drawn with precision and must be determined from the
facts of each case.93
In People ex rel. Gray v. Village of Hawthorn Woods,9 4 the court
found that the common boundary connecting for a distance of 128.7
feet met this test of reasonableness. From these decisions and others,9
it seems apparent that the court's liberal interpretation of "contiguous"
in annexation and incorporation cases is bounded only by that degree
of unreasonableness found in the Village of Streamwood plan.
Also spawned in this era of urban expansion was section 7-39a of the
Cities and Villages Act, which established a procedure whereby prop-
89 15 Ill.2d 595, 155 N.E.2d 635 (1959). 92 19 Ill.2d 342, 167 N.E.2d 169 (1960).
90 Id. at 597, 155 N.E.2d at 636. 93 Id. at 352, 167 N.E.2d at 175.
91 Id. at 601, 155 N.E.2d at 638. 94 19 Ill.2d 316, 167 N.E.2d 176 (1960).
95 Spaulding School Dist. No. 58 v. City of Waukegan, 18 I1.2d 518, 165 N.E.2d 329
(1960); In re Flossmoor v. Mutual Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 23 Ill. App.2d 440, 163
N.E.2d 215 (1960).
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erty owners whose land has been included within the boundaries of a
newly incorporated municipality may disconnect therefrom." The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this procedure in Bergis
v. Village of Sunnyside7 and added: "[N]o -taxpayer has any vested
right in the village as a municipal corporation or any guaranty that its
boundaries will remain unchanged or that it may not lose its corporate
life. Those hazards are incident to the ownership of property within a
city or village. '98
The overwhelming burden which the population boom in the sub-
urban areas placed upon their educational and recreational facilities
gave rise to a practice whereby subdividers were required to con-
tribute a certain percentage of their land for these civic purposes, to
pay a specified sum per housing unit to defray the added expense of
such on the municipality, and in some instances to even construct and
equip the facility itself. This practice was brought to the attention of
the Supreme Court in Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove.99 There,
the village had established a plan commission which tentatively ap-
proved plats of subdivision subject to the issuance of a certificate of
compliance from the boards of education of the elementary and high
school districts in which the property was located. Issuance of the said
certificate and final approval of plaintiff's plat was withheld until he
had executed an agreement which required him to deposit in escrow
the sum of $325 for each lot sold. The money was to be held in escrow
for two years, at which time it was to become the exclusive property
of the school districts. The court held that section 53-2 of the Revised
Cities and Villages Act authorizes the establishment of "reasonable re-
quirements for. . . school grounds,"'00 but does not authorize a village
to adopt a subdivision control ordinance requiring that a subdivider,
as a prerequisite to obtaining planning commission approval of a plat,
must dedicate land for "educational purposes" where that term is not
restricted to the statutory "school grounds." The court further found
that there was no statutory authority for substituting monetary
charges for the dedication of land, and that the $325 per lot was based
06 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 7-39a (1959).
97 13 Ill.2d 50, 147 N.E.2d 333 (1958); see also Anderson v. City of Rolling Meadows,
10 l1.2d 54, 139 N.E.2d 199 (1956); Indian Creek v. Petitioners for Disconnection, 27
I11. App.2d 321, 169 N.E.2d 598 (1960).
98 13 I11.2d at 52-53, 147 N.E.2d at 335.
9) 19 1ll.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
100 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 53-2(2) (1959).
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upon factors totally unrelated to the proposed subdivision. The court
noted that it had sustained the requirement that a subdivider provide
curbs and gutters in Petterson v. City of Naperville'01 upon the theory
that the developer of a subdivision may be required to assume those
costs which are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activities
and which would otherwise be cast upon the public. But other than to
reiterate this position that the requirements imposed must be related to
the needs of the specific subdivision rather than to the needs which
stem from the total activity of the community, the court refused to
pass upon the question of a municipality's power to require the dedica-
tion of land for school grounds.
MUNICIPAL SERVANTS
The rights of municipal officers and employees have long been a
fertile field for adjudication in Municipal Law. The civil service merit
system in the United States has existed for three-quarters of a century.
Chicago and Evanston became the first cities in the Middle West to
have civil service laws by adopting the same in 1895, and in 1905, Illi-
nois became the nation's fourth state to adopt a merit system.10 2 The
development in this important area during the past ten years has been
notable. Only since January 1, 1950, have the decisions of the Civil
Service trial board been subject to judicial review under the terms and
provisions of the Administrative Review Act.'0 3 Prior to that time the
avenue available to those aggrieved by the action of the trial board was
the grossly inadequate petition for a writ of certiorari, where the only
proper inquiry was whether the Commission had jurisdiction and had
proceeded legally.
In the past ten years the scope of review by the courts of a final
administrative decision has been well defined by the courts. In Adamek
v. Civil Service Comm'n, °4 the trial court reversed an order of the
Civil Service Commission which, in turn, had found Adamek, a patrol-
man in the Chicago Police Department, guilty of conduct unbecoming
an officer by reason of his having solicited and received a bribe, and
ordered his discharge. The Appellate Court, in reversing the trial court
and sustaining the discharge of Adamek said:
1019 IU.2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
102 KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE 25-27 (1958).
103 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24J, S 149a (1950).
104 17 111. App.2d 11, 149 N.E.2d 466 (1958).
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It has apparently become necessary to again state the limitations which the
statute and the decisions of the courts have imposed.
.. . The function of the Circuit Court or Superior Court in acting as the
primary court of review of the finding of an administrative agency is much
different from its function in passing on the verdict of the jury returned in a
case tried before it. In the latter case the court has the duty and right to
consider the weight of the evidence and to grant a new trial if the verdict is
not sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. In the former it can only
set aside the finding of the administrative agency if the finding is against the
manifest weight of the evidence .... 105
The court further stated: "The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the only function of the courts reviewing orders of administrative
agencies is to consider the record to determine if the findings and
orders of the administrative agency are against the manifest weight of
the evidence. . . ." [Citations omitted.]1 0 6 The court then continued:
. . . The reviewing courts have no authority to try the case anew upon the
record or to substitute their judgment for that of the commission or in any
manner to modify or revise the commission's order. . . . [Citation omitted.]
The fact that the court, if it had been hearing the case originally, would have
from the evidence reached a conclusion different from that reached by the
commission is immaterial.
10 7
The problem of the trial court substituting its judgment for that of
the Civil Service Commission on administrative review came before
the Appellate Court in 1955 when that court had for its consideration a
number of cases'08 involving police officers who had been discharged
after a hearing before the Commission for violation of various rules.
The violations included failure to report for duty, leaving post with-
out permission, failure to report involvement in an automobile acci-
dent, failure to properly guard a prisoner, so that he escaped, failure to
properly account for money taken from a prisoner, and signing the
sergeant's name to an inventory of property taken. In each of these
cases the plaintiff sought administrative review. In each case, the find-
ing of the Civil Service Commission was reversed by the Circuit Court
and subsequently the Appellate Court reversed the trial court and sus-
105 Id. at 15-17, 149 N.E.2d at 468-69.
106 Id. at 17, 149 N.E.2d at 469.
107 Id. at 20, 149 N.E.2d at 471.
108 Nolting v. Civil Service Comm'n, 7 I11. App.2d 147, 129 N.E.2d 236 (1955); Wat-
kins v. Civil Service Comm'n, 7 Ill. App.2d 140,129 N.E.2d 254 (1955); Foreman v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 7 11. App.2d 122, 129 N.E.2d 245 (1955); Martin v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 7 Ill. App.2d 128, 129 N.E.2d 248 (1955).
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tained the Civil Service Commission. In Nolting v. Civil Service
Comm'n,'019 the court wrote the principal opinion and severely criti-
cized the position taken by the trial court in two of the cases that the
punishment of discharge was too harsh and severe for the violations
committed. The court said:
It appears to us that these judgments were based on the erroneous assump-
tion that courts have general jurisdiction over orders of the Civil Service
Commission and that they may consider the severity of the punishment or
matters in mitigation and may enter such orders as appear kind and merciful.
These proceedings do not involve contests between litigants over civil rights
but are, in effect, appeals from orders of public officials in the executive de-
partment to public officials in the judicial department. It is easy in such cases
for courts to fall into the error of assuming their function to be charismatic
and to take on the character of a supercommission or superchief of police.110
In general, the court's approach in this area seems to have developed
into one of "great care and caution before they set aside the acts of the
executive department of the government,""' but one which is none-
theless mindful that the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
is not violated when the findings of an administrative agency are judi-
cially reviewed to determine whether they are contrary to the mani-
fest weight of evidence."'
The Nolting case was also authority for the premise that the Com-
mission, being limited by statute in its findings to an order for dis-
charge, had no authority to suspend an employee; however, a 1957
amendment to the act" 3 secured this alternative penalty for the Com-
mission.
The approach of "caution" or judicial restraint in interfering with
executive action has properly given the municipality that degree of
latitude necessary to maintain efficient and effective personnel control.
"In fields such as this, courts must recognize that the relationship of
the executive department to its employees is involved and that the
discipline of an entire department may be affected."" 4 The court's ad-
10 Supra note 108.
110 Nolting v. Civil Service Comm'n, 7 Il1. App.2d 147, 152-53, 129 N.E.2d 236, 239
(1955).
111 People ex rel. Erickson v. Sheehan, 24 I11. App.2d 43, 54, 163 N.E.2d 834, 839
(1959).
112 Harrison v. Civil Service Comni'n, 1 ll.2d 137, 115 N.E.2d 521 (1953).
113 111. Laws 1957, at 1407.
114 People ex rel. Erickson v. Sheehan, 24 111. App.2d 43, 54; 163 N.E.2d 834, 839
(1959).
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herence to this principle during the past few years has been steadfast.
The acknowledgment of the right to cancel or strike a promotional
list after two years "on the grounds of unfairness or impropriety as
well as on the grounds of 'staleness,' "115 the recognition that until a
department head determines that a vacancy which exists in his depart-
ment needs filling and requisitions the Civil Service Commission to evi-
dence his determination, such vacancy as a matter of law does not
exist,116 and the declaration to the effect that "civil service employees
have no vested right to the performance of any duties or responsibili-
ties once assigned to them,"" 7 thereby sustaining departmental reor-
ganization or transfer of duties, provide ample testimony of that ad-
herence.
Kelly v. Chicago Park Dist.118 certainly ranks as one of the major
civil service decisions in recent times. Every suit for reinstatement
from an alleged wrongful discharge is accompanied or followed by an
action for back salary. Prior to 1951, the courts took the position that
officers, elected or appointed, had a right to the salary attached to the
said office and, upon wrongful discharge or removal, were entitled to
the full salary due to the office upon reinstatement thereto, regardless
of any outside earnings. 119 In the Kelly case the court recognized that
a distinction did exist between civil service employees and officers, and
found "that the rules of compensation applicable to public officers do
not apply.' 120 With this obstacle out of the way, the court readily
adopted the principle of "avoidable consequences" in these back salary
cases by saying: "We see no basis for a finding that plaintiffs are
entitled to be paid for their services twice, when none were rendered.
It is our view that the Appellate Court erroneously held that plaintiff's
salaries could not be reduced by earnings from outside employ-
ment.'1' The duty to mitigate salary losses during the period of
wrongful ouster and the right of the municipality to a set off having
115 Id. at 51, 163 N.E.2d at 837; See also Malkin v. City of Chicago, 6 Ill. App.2d 151,
127 N.E.2d 145 (1955); Boldion v. Hurley, 9 11. App.2d 532, 133 N.E.2d 522 (1956).
116 People ex rel. Foley v. Prendergast, 345 111. App. 235,102 N.E.2d 668 (1952).
117 Feeley v. O'Connor, 17 111. App.2d 123, 137, 149 N.E.2d 411, 418 (1958); see also
People ex rel. Kenny v. Fornof, 343 Ill. App. 73,98 N.E.2d 127 (1951).
118 409 111. 91, 98 N.E.2d 738 (1952).
119 Bullis v. City of Chicago, 235 111.472,85 N.E. 614 (1908).
120 Kelly v. Chicago Park Dist., 409 Ill. 91, 97,98 N.E.2d 738, 742 (1952).
121 Id. at 98,98 N.E.2d at 742.
CORPORATIONS
been thus established, have subsequently received unanimous case sup-
port.122
SUNDAY LAWS
Sunday closing ordinances were the subject of two important Su-
preme Court cases during the past ten years, and the change of focus
which the court evidences in the basic rationale underlying the deci-
sions is particularly noteworthy. In Humphrey Chevrolet v. City of
Evanston,2 3 the court, in sustaining a "commodity type" ordinance,
stated:
[T]here is no doubt but that an Illinois city may by ordinance, as a valid ex-
ercise of its general police power, prohibit certain business activity on Sun-
day.... [Citations omitted. For Sunday has been observed traditionally as a
day on which the normal, nonessential, nonemergency activity of the business
world ceases .... [I]t is everywhere recognized that legislative bodies may
properly act to preserve this deep-rooted, nation wide custom, providing only
that the measures adopted are reasonable. 124
Four years later the Supreme Court made no mention of this "deep
rooted, nation-wide custom" or that "Sunday has been traditionally
observed" when it struck down a comprehensive closing ordinance in
Pacesetter Homes Inc. v. Village of South Holland.12 5 There, the test
prescribed to determine validity was whether or not the restricted
business actually tended to disturb others in their observance of a reli-
gious holiday. The court said:
A Sunday law which has as its object the promotion of religion or worship
is beyond the scope of governmental power, but one which seeks merely to
protect those desiring to worship from disturbance and distraction by others
is valid. . . . Since the only legitimate purpose of Sunday laws is to enable
others to worship free from disturbance, it follows that activities otherwise
lawful can be prohibited only if they reasonably tend to disturb others. 126
The majority opinion in the Pacesetter case found that the facts before
it were distinguishable from the Humphrey Chevrolet case, saying that
"the object in this case is the maintenance of quiet and order, and the
evil to be remedied is disturbance of others in their religious wor-
122 Nolting v. Civil Service Comm'n, 7 Ill. App.2d 147, 129 N.E.2d 236 (1955); People
ex rel. Trapp v. Tanner, 19 11. App.2d 138, 153 N.E.2d 246 (1958) (affirms the dis-
tinction between officer or employee, and holds no setoff against officer); People ex
rel. Krich v. Hurley, 23 111. App.2d 246, 161 N.E.2d 884 (1959), aff'd, 19 Ill.2d 548, 169
N.E.2d 107 (1960); People ex rel. Lasser v. Ramsey, 23 Ill. App.2d 100, 161 N.E.2d 690
(1959).
123 7 Ill.2d 402, 131 N.E.2d 70 (1955). 125 18 Il.2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464 (1959).
124 Id. at 405, 131 N.E.2d at 72-73. 126 Id. at 253, 163 N.E.2d at 468.
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ship" ;127 whereas the one dissenting voice stated that "the actual dis-
turbance caused by the proscribed activities was not considered in
Humphrey.' '128 It is this author's expectation that any uncertainty
which exists in this area will soon be dispelled by the United States
Supreme Court, which currently has before it for its consideration
four cases129 argued in early December 1960, challenging the Sunday
Blue Laws of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania and the Sunday Closing
Laws of Pennsylvania and Maryland.
CONCLUSION
The above comments, topics, and cases are by no means exhaustive
of the ten-year growth in what was at the outset labeled "the most ex-
pansive general legal topic in the sphere of jurisprudence today." This
author is painfully aware of the gaping holes which have been left by
this cursory treatment of the individual areas within the field of Munic-
ipal Law. Many of these areas by themselves have, in fact, supplied
enough material for papers twice the size of this. An attempt has been
made, however, to show that Municipal Law has something within its
vast range to satisfy the needs of every practitioner-young or old. It is
vibrantly alive, excitingly diversified, and ever-challenging as we in
local government try to conquer our new frontiers. Urban living has
been and will continue on the upswing in this country, thereby placing
the very greatest of importance on that area of legal endeavors called
Municipal Law.
127 Id. at 255, 163 N.E.2d at 469.
128 Id. at 256-57, 163 N.E.2d at 930 (dissenting opinion).
129 McGowan v. Maryland, 220 Md. 117, 151 A.2d 156 (1959), probable jurisdiction
noted, 362 U.S. 959 (1960); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc.,
176 F. Supp. 466 (1959), probable jurisdiction noted, 362 U.S. 960 (1960); Two Guys
from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944 (1959), probable juris-
diction noted, 362 U.S. 960 (1960); Braunfield v. Gibbons, 184 F. Supp. 352 (1959),
probable jurisdiction noted, 362 U.S. 987 (1960).
